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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past fifteen years, international environmental lawyers
and legal scholars have devoted increasing attention to movements
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and cases at the intersection of environmental protection and
human rights law. From an academic perspective, the questions
that arise from this collision are intriguing, engaging one in issues
of moral philosophy, comparative law, and the nature and sources
of international law. From a utilitarian perspective, the question
appears more blunt: What are the advantages and disadvantages of
merging the two fields? In entering this still-evolving scene, this
paper has put on the blinders of a somewhat relativist
presumption-that one's visible spectrum depends on one's
lens-and evaluates a variety of potential approaches from the
perspective of an environmental advocate seeking to effect change.
Within the well-established human rights system, there exist at
least three ways to promote environmental ends (each of which is
discussed further in Section III below): (1) mobilizing existing
rights to achieve environmental ends; (2) reinterpreting existing
rights to include environmental concerns; and (3) creating new
rights, such as the right to a clean environment.' To justify
engaging in any one of these processes, an advocate must recognize
both their moral legitimacy and legal utility. As one author has
argued, "the justification for rights is to be found in the way in
which they enable us to address a key issue, namely, the realization
of individual and group autonomy, which we could not do using
other concepts and which gives them a unique place in moral and
legal argument. "
2
Parsing out the above statement reveals several central
presuppositions of this paper. First, the pragmatism that underlies
any discussion of creating a new right to a clean environment,
lawyering for the recognition of such a right under existing
regimes, or advocating for the inclusion of protections within
existing rights, must be balanced with the more philosophical
underpinnings of the rights-based discourse. In this paper, I limit
the discussion primarily to what little concrete has been poured to
build a foundation for environmental rights, rather than analyzing
the more abstract designs of eco-rhetoric. Second, the utility of
such advocacy approaches is to be found in contrast to the failure
1. Michael R. Anderson, Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection: An Overview,
in HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES To ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 1, 4 (Alan E. Boyle &
Michael R. Anderson eds. 1996).
2. J.G. Merrills, Environmental Protection and Human Rights: Conceptual Aspects, in HUMAN
RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 25, supra note 1, at 27.
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of other methods and regimes -domestic and international -to
adequately address certain existing problems. Finally, there is an
important distinction to be drawn between (1) the justifications for
creating a new right to a healthy environment; and (2) the act of
litigating under existing conventions for recognition or inclusion
of environmental rights
II. AN OVERVIEW OF PROS AND CONS
Before turning to the foregoing three human rights approaches
to environmental protection, it is of some interest to note that the
inquiry into the advantages of such pursuits has already provoked a
backlash. For several reasons, some environmental advocates and
academics have been hesitant to hop on the human rights
bandwagon. First, critics of the human rights approach stress the
paramount role of domestic legislation and regulation in effective
environmental management. Indeed, in summarizing the dated-
yet-seminal collection of essays on the subject titled Human Rights
Approaches to Environmental Protection, Michael Anderson suggests a
cautious view of the role of international law. Anderson indicates
problems of cross-cultural application, varying socio-economic
circumstances and fundamental differences in justiciability and
application as reasons to confine international human rights law to
a general and supervisory role. Furthermore, Anderson affirms
that "rights developed in national law may well evolve into crucial
tools for everyday environmental management." 3 Conspicuously
absent from this list of limiting factors is the oft-perceived inefficacy
of international environmental regimes in achieving real
protections.
Second, there are potential tensions that exist between advocates
working in the environmental and human rights law sectors.
Following the "rising sea lifts all boats" argument most often made
by government representatives from developing nations and free
market operatives in the Global North, some argue that
environmental degradation is a prerequisite to achieving the
material wealth that ultimately enables human rights protections.
If the established human rights to life, health, property, culture, and
decent living conditions are to be fulfilled for the majority of the
global population rather than just a minority, and if those rights are
3. Anderson, supra note 1, at 2.
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realized in the pursuit of affluence rather than moderation, then a
rapid depletion of natural resources is a likely consequence.
Alternatively, human rights advocates might very well resent
environmentalists who place treatment of people and plants on the
same ethical plane. People who are struggling to survive on an
individual or collective level, who are victims of torture or
genocide, or who face other gross violations of conventional
human rights-the argument runs-are likely to be less
concerned, at least at the moment, with long-term visions of
environmental or ecological health.
Ultimately, each of the foregoing arguments is refutable. In the
first instance, while domestic law will likely remain the primary
vehicle for environmental decision-making, the scope and
influence of international environmental law is expanding.
Obligations imposed by many bilateral and multilateral treaties
have infiltrated the boundaries of national sovereignty and while
enforcement mechanisms are generally weak, they do exist.' There
is no reason to preclude working through international regimes to
effect important changes merely because domestic ones have more
obvious power. It will take all kinds of efforts to achieve our various
long-term goals.
In the second instance, the juxtaposition between human rights
and environmental concerns presupposes a difference not only in
their desired ends, but also in perspectives on how to attain those
ends. That is, the argument which maintains a clear distinction
between the two seems to ignore the real possibility that
environmentalists agree whole-heartedly with certain goals of
human rights advocates, while believing that the promotion of
sustainable development, biological diversity, clean water and clean
air represents a promising approach to achievement of the
envisioned utopia. In fact, this view-which is essentially a hybrid
4. Id. at 3.
5. Citizen action provisions in the human rights commissions and courts discussed below,
as well as in such other bodies as the Nafta via the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, do offer limited access to justice for non-state actors. Moreover,
as discussed briefly further below, NGOs play a prominent role in monitoring and
enforcement in some regimes. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550, and the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S.
243, are among the MEAs most cited in support of the proposition that NGOs can find a
place in international environmental law. However, the mechanics of state-to-state relations
remain the status quo within the field.
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of environmentalism and human rights activism-is held by those
who ultimately insist that human rights and environmental
protection are interdependent. On one hand, this line of
argument runs, it is possible that environmental protection will
lead to the fulfillment of human rights. On the other hand,
human rights lead to greater environmental protection by ensuring
substantive rights such as life, property and health, and procedural
rights such as access to justice, political accountability and
transparency, and self-determination.
III. THREE HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
As noted above, there are three generally recognized human
rights approaches to environmental protection: (1) mobilizing
existing rights to achieve environmental ends; (2) reinterpreting
existing rights to include environmental concerns; and (3) creating
new rights.
In theory, mobilizing existing rights works primarily within two
different bodies of human rights law to bring about environmental
change. The 1966 United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights6 protects certain rights, namely the rights to life, association,
participation, liberty, equality and legal redress. The Covenant
operates most prominently in the protection of individual
environmental activists, who have been, and continue to be,
targeted by governments and corporations alike for everything
from detention to murder, and in the protection of their attempts
to engage in political processes and civil resistance.7 The rights
guaranteed under the 1966 United Nations Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights-such as the right to health,
decent living conditions and a decent working environment-bear
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm.
7. See Human Rights Watch & Natural Resources Defense Council, DEFENDING THE
EARTH: ABUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992). The joint study, through a
series of narratives, identifies the ways in which human rights violations promote
environmental degradation: suppression of activists and campaigns, restrictions on
association and assembly, mistreatment of whistleblowers, restrictions on media and attacks
onjournalists, and restrictions on access to information held by the government.
8. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (1966).
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more directly on general, substantive standards for human well-
being.
The reinterpretation of existing rights to include environmental
concerns is different from the mobilization strategy insofar as it
defines environmental degradation itself as a human rights
violation. This process of reinterpretation essentially comprises
lawyering through the international system to read environmental
protections into established human rights that do not explicitly
provide for such protections. For instance, the right to life may be
violated by a government's refusal to enforce toxic waste cleanups
where the waste contaminates drinking water. Alternatively, the
right to equality might demand a scheme under which the burdens
of pollution are distributed more equitably among nations. Or the
protection of the right to property could be interpreted as a
straightforward environmental protection. The success of this
approach is limited, it seems, only by the imagination and
persuasiveness of legal advocates, and the receptiveness of
international jurists.
The movement to create a new right is arguably the most
grandiose of the three options. It may even be argued that a
comprehensive right that relates directly and explicitly to
environmental protection is the only truly viable route to securing
environmental protection in the human rights system.9 In its most
prominent formulation, such a right is divided into procedural
rights and substantive rights.'° Procedural rights have the benefit
of cultural and political sensitivity in defining appropriate levels
within individual nations or regions while substantive rights may
provide stronger protections against potentially misinformed
governments (and their represented publics) bent on getting rich
quick and achieving gross levels of consumption. Regarding the
latter, however, national regulations typically provide for
quantitative measurements of environmental quality. Therefore,
the shift to the international sphere requires a concomitant shift to
qualitative definitions. And herein one encounters various
semantic choices: "clean," "healthy," "decent," "viable,"
"sustainable." What any of these terms actually means remains an
open question.
9. Anderson, supra note 1, at 10.
10. See Human Rights and the Environment: inal report, U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Hum.
Rts., 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 (1994) ("the Ksentini Report").
[Vol. 28:2
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These three approaches to integrating international
environmental and human rights law may be understood as
containing two distinct advocacy tracts. The first two approaches-
mobilization and reinterpretation of existing rights-comprise a
category that emphasizes the bi-polar nature of legal justice and
seeks to create case law precedent via quasi-litigation in
international forums such as the United Nations and Inter-
American and European Commissions for Human Rights. The
precedents set, though technically binding, may prove to be only
loosely so, given the unenforceability of many of these decisions.
However, such precedents may also affect claims for damages in
domestic courts, including claims made in the United States under
the Alien Tort Claims Act." The third approach-creation of a
new right-can be distinguished from the others in that it
represents the polycentric approach typical of policy formation.
This tactic is perhaps best understood as a diplomatic effort to
formulate a new international standard buttressed by treaty.
IV. THE RIGHT TO A CLEAN ENVIRONMENT
A. Jurisprudential Bases
There are at least four potential jurisprudential bases for the
right to a clean environment. 12 First, an argument can be made
that such a right is a norm that is already embedded within legal
systems through common law, such as nuisance and the principle
that one shall not use one's property to harm another.
Accordingly-the argument proceeds-the right should be
treated as a general principle of the law of civilized nations.1
3
Second, one can argue that the right is a logical outcome of other
human rights such as the rights to property and life, which
themselves contain implicit guarantees of environmental health.
(This theory undergirds the movement to reinterpret or mobilize
existing rights.) Third, an argument can be articulated that the
11. 28 U.S.C. 1350 (1993).
12. Anderson, supra note 1, at 13.
13. Anderson claims that an argument along these lines exists for environmental rights as
possessing the weight of jus cogens, or peremptory norms. While I do not doubt that such an
argument could be made, and in fact the issue is brushed in the following paragraphs, there
is not the room in this paper to adequately state the case. Therefore I have substituted
general principles for jus cogens, which seem to better fit the evidence offered.
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environmental right is emerging as a customary norm as an
indirect result of the increasing number of national constitutions
that explicitly guarantee the right to a clean or healthy
environment 4 and the increasing number of treaty obligations that
bear on environmental protection.1' Finally, an argument can be
made that there is not yet such a right but that one ought to be
created through treaty, protocol or declaration.
B. Supporting Treaties and Soft Law
The 1972 Stockholm Declaration states: "Man has the
fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of
life in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and
well-being.' 16 By contrast, the 1992 Rio Declaration dissolves the
concept of human rights into the concept of sustainable
development and forgoes the language implicating a right to the
environment altogether: "Human beings are at the center of
concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a
healthy and productive life in harmony with nature." 7  The
relationship between the two Declarations is a complex one, but it
is at least tenable to read the latter as absorbing or superceding the
former. The dissolution, then, seems to dilute the fundamental
right encoded in the already "soft" law of the Stockholm
Declaration to an even weaker "entitlement" granted by the grace
of governments. The difference, here, appears to be that the
former right is protected in all circumstances, while the latter
entitlement can be taken away with adequate due process, or after
an adequate balancing against other considerations.
14. See EARTHJUSTICE LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
MATERIALS FOR THE FIFTY-SEVENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 39-40 (2001) at
http://www.earthjustice.org/regional/international/2001-human _rightsjssuepaper.pdf;
EARTHJUSTICE LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: MATERIALS FOR
THE FIFtY-EIGHTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 21 (2002) at
http://www.earthjustice.org/regional/international/2002%20 ISSUE%20PAPER-
DEVELOPMENTS-FINAL.pdf.
15. MATERIALS FOR THE FIFTY-SEVENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 14, at
7-11.
16. Declaration on Environment and Development. Report of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, Principle 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1972), 11 I.L.M. 1416
("the Stockholm Declaration").
17. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Pinciple 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (1992), in U.N. CONFERENCE ON EDUC. & DEV., AGENDA 21:
PROGRAMME OF ACTION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 7, U.N. Sales No. E.93.I.11 (1993).
[Vol. 28:2
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The right to a decent, healthy or viable environment also appears
in a variety of global and regional human rights treaties. The 1981
African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights, for
instance, states that "All peoples shall have the right to a general
satisfactory environment favorable to their development." 8 The
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child guarantees the right of
the child "to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
health."19 To implement the standard, States' Parties are obligated
to take appropriate measures "to combat disease and
malnutrition.., through, inter alia... the provision of adequate
nutritious foods and clean drinking-water, taking into
consideration the dangers and risks of environmental pollution."
2 0
Article 11 of the Additional Protocol to the Inter-American
Convention on Human Rights, though it has not yet entered into
force, provides that "'[e]veryone shall have the right to live in a
healthy environment and to have access to basic public services."
2
1
Similarly, international organizations have made various
statements that bear on environmental rights. Principle 23 of the
1982 World Charter for Nature, for instance, provides that "All
persons, in accordance with their national legislation, shall have
the opportunity to participate, individually or with others, in the
formulation of decisions of direct concern to their environment,
and shall have access to means of redress when their environment
has suffered damage or degradation."
22
Moreover, the right to a clean or healthy environment has
achieved constitutional status within some national legal systems,
stated either explicitly or through judicial interpretation of other
constitutional rights. The Constitution of Ecuador, for instance,
calls for an environment "free from pollution." 2' The Constitution
18. African [Banjul]Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, art. 24, OAU
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 28 I.L.M. 59.
19. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., art.
24(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989).
20. Id. art. 24(2)(c).
21. Additional Protocol to the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("Protocol of San Salvador") in Basic Documents Pertaining
to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OAS Doc. OAS/Ser.L/V/I.4 rev.8 (May 22,
2001), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/ Basicos/basic5.htm [hereinafter Protocol of San
Salvador].
22. G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/7 (1982); see also Hague
Declaration on the Environment, Mar. 11, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1308.
23. ECUADOR CONST. art. 23 § 6.
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of Portugal calls for a "healthy and ecologically balanced human
environment. "
24
Admittedly, the diverse manifestations of the substantive right to
a clean or healthy environment detract from the right's alleged
universality, from the argument that such a right already exists as a
general principle of the law of civilized nations. However, it seems
that the complicated nature and identity of this right also lends
support to the contention that the right represents an emerging
customary norm. State practice and opinio juris have probably not
yet ratified such a custom, but these developments do give
credence to the potential for such a claim in the future.
In the early 1990s the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities undertook a study on
human rights and environment issues. The Final Report of the
Sub-Commission ("the Ksentini Report")," issued in 1994,
concludes that the right to a healthy and decent environment is
part of existing international law and is capable of immediate
implementation by existing human rights bodies. According to the
Report, environmental rights include both the substantive right to
development, health and life, and procedural rights to public
participation and access to justice. The Ksentini Report includes a
list of draft principles that include: a) freedom from pollution,
environmental degradation and activities that adversely affect the
environment, or threaten life, health, livelihood, well-being or
sustainable development; b) protection and preservation of the air,
soil, water, sea-ice, flora and fauna, and the essential processes and
areas necessary to maintain biological diversity and ecosystems; c)
the highest attainable standard of health; d) safe and healthy food,
water and working environment; e) adequate housing, land tenure
and living conditions in a secure, healthy and ecologically sound
environment; f) ecologically sound access to nature and the
conservation and sustainable use of nature and natural resources;
g) preservation of unique sites; and h) enjoyment of traditional life
and subsistence for indigenous peoples.
24. PORT. CONST. art. 66 § 1; see also Anderson, supra note 1, at 10-11. See generally National
Case Studies, in HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 1.
25. Supra note 10.
[Vol. 28:2
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C. Arguments for the Substantive Right to a Clean Environment
The primary argument for adopting the Ksentini Report's Draft
Principles, or else some other formulation of substantive rights, is
that doing so would place environmental quality on par with other
economic and social rights, and that doing so would "recognize the
vital character of the environment as a basic condition of life,
indispensable to the promotion of human dignity and welfare, and
to the fulfillment of other human rights. 26 Indeed, weighing the
advantages and disadvantages of a substantive right, Anderson
asserts that "a human rights approach is a strong claim, a claim to
an absolute entitlement theoretically immune to the lobbying and
trade-offs which characterize bureaucratic decision-making. Its
power lies in its ability to trump individual greed and short-term
thinking. 2 7 The elevation of environmental rights into the moral
realm of human rights may ultimately inspire increased attention
from the press and public, and ensure a continued activist
response.
D. Arguments Against the Substantive Right to a Clean
Environment
There are at least two arguments against instituting a substantive
right to a clean environment. As one author phrases it: "The
substantive question... is whether what is being created is (a)
adequately defined and (b) sufficiently distinct from concepts
which impinge upon it... for it to be useful or sensible to make a
new set of distinctions."2 It is unclear whether the right to a clean
environment is either adequately defined or sufficiently distinctive.
In addressing the first problem, it is immediately apparent that
there are substantial obstacles to achieving a clear and uniform
definition of substantive environmental rights. What constitutes a
clean, healthy, satisfactory, decent, viable or ecologically sound
26. Alan Boyle, The Role of International Human Rights Law in the Protection of the
Environment, in HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 43, supra note
1, at 49.
27. Anderson, supra note 1, at 21. The equivalence of "human rights" with "absolute
entitlement" here can be distinguished from the Stockholm/Rio differentiation of rights
and entitlements above: an "absolute entitlement" seems grounded in the same notions of
natural rights as other conventionally-regarded human rights; an "entitlement" lacks such
force, being a legal rather than fundamental relation between state and individual.
28. Merrills, supra note 2, at 30.
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environment is a difficult question, requiring exactly the kinds of
discretionary interpretations that governments are loathe to leave
to the pens of international judiciaries. Moreover, there are
questions beyond that of the standard's proper definition: Who is
obligated to perform under the rights? What is the scope of the
obligation? How does the new right relate to other rights? 9 To the
extent that such vagaries compromise the moral force behind the
movement for environmental rights, they may prove more hurtful
than helpful.
In comparing environmental rights to other conventionally
regarded human rights it is important to recognize the unique
development of the former. The argument for a substantive right
seems to rely less on the presumptions of natural law theories than
it does on a body of law already in effect. Indeed, much of
international environmental law represents negotiated policy
decisions that already stand in the pantheon of international
relations. The development of environmental protection regimes
within nations, regions and the global community occurs through a
complex balancing act and the delineation of socio-economic
priorities. This ordering is a far cry from the impetus to prohibit
and eradicate torture, enslavement, or genocide. Patently, there is
a strong argument that environmental rights, as they exist, are not
in fact non-derogable, a quality often claimed quintessential to
international human rights. Moreover, there is a non-human third
party acting as medium in this equation. Thus, the question of
what is being defined is added to the question of what the
definition is.
Ultimately, though, it is somewhat disingenuous to forgo
discussion of an issue because of problems of definition. Such
problems saturate every attempt to secure new rights and
obligations under international law. Environmental rights, then,
are no different than the. human rights secured under the 1966
Covenants and the subsidiary rights promoting the rights of
indigenous peoples. Moreover, defining the boundaries might
require procedures not dissimilar to reaching agreements on
biodiversity, global warming or fisheries.
In regard to the second problem, that of distinguishing a
proposed substantive right from existing rights, at least one author
29. See id. at 34.
[Vol. 28:2
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has pointed out that certain environmental rights, such as the right
to compensation for harm and the right to access for
environmental information, to the extent that they "demarcate a
sacrosanct area of life in order to promote self-realization and
development," fit easily within the general concept of individualism
and human rights.30 Moreover, the moral foundation of human
rights easily accommodates the addition of environmental rights.
31
Indeed, according to one advocacy approach, substantive
environmental rights may already be covered under existing
treaties and norms. A new document in support of specific
environmental rights might prove redundant. Furthermore, a
proposed treaty rejected for these or other reasons might stand as
evidence against the universality of environmental rights. Such
overlap, or rejection of a proposed new right, might prove
damaging by creating conflicts within human rights law itself.
When the United Nations Covenants were adopted in 1966,
customary international law required only that states act with
reasonable regard for the rights of others in the exercise of
freedom on the high seas, cooperate on the use of shared resources
such as international rivers, and prevent trans-boundary pollution
affecting their neighbors. Given the proliferation of multilateral
and bilateral environmental treaties since 1966, circumstances have
most certainly changed. In the words of Alan Boyle: "Given the
now extensive scope of international environmental law and policy,
and their intrusion into all aspects of environmental protection,
including the reserved domain of domestic sovereignty, what is left
for a substantive human right to a decent environment to do that
has not already been done?"
3 2
There is an obvious enough answer to the above question. The
scope of international environmental law differs from human rights
law in that it does not imbue individuals with non-derogable rights.
While some of the international environmental conventions make
room for civil society-almost exclusively as participants and
monitors, though rarely as active members or as individuals with
standing to bring an action to dispute resolution-none of them
ensures that individuals have their individual rights protected. A
substantive human right to a clean environment would add a
30. Id. at 28.
31. Id.
32. Boyle, supra note 26, at 56.
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degree of protection that individuals do not have under any other
regime.
E. Participatory Rights
Advocates are also working toward defining participatory, or
procedural rights, which are unique to the environmental arena.
Such rights would likely include access to environmental justice
and participation in environmental decision-making. Such an
approach rests in part on the view that governments benefit from
the input of civil society. It also rests on the notion that individuals
have a natural right to such avenues. Herein, perhaps, lies the
strongest moral and legal case for creating environmental rights
under treaty.33
V. ADVOCACY THROUGH QUASI-LITIGATION AND CASE LAW
The approach to environmental protection in which cases are
brought before existing arbiters of human rights under existing
conventions seeks to create new rights from within the confines of
existing law, rather than to impose them from without. In this
approach, environmental rights are seen as legally, as well as
morally, intrinsic to the human rights already recognized by the
majority of the world. By carving out environmental rights through
case law and precedent, advocates may find it easier to define the
right and set the standards than by starting from scratch. "If the
aim is to improve the protection of the environment it is therefore
arguable that the effort put in to promoting collective
33. Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration states:
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens,
at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access
to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including
information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the
opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and
encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely available.
Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and
remedy, shall be provided.
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 17. Other textual support for
procedural rights includes Principle 23 of the World Charter for Nature, the 1991 ECE
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment, and the 1992 Biological Diversity
Convention, as well as the Draft Principles of the Ksentini Report, supra note 10.
[Vol. 28:2
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'environmental rights' might be better directed to more specific
aims. ,34
A. An Overview of Relevant Laws
Lawyering through the existing system involves activity in two
primary areas: (1) civil and political rights; and (2) economic,
social and cultural rights.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights", the
European Convention on Human Rights,3 and the American
Convention on Human Rights37 are the primary treaties dealing
with civil and political rights. These include the right to life 3 and
the right to property or home.39 It is generally accepted that the
right to life may be invoked in extreme cases, such as the incidents
at Bhopal or Chernobyl, to obtain compensation for death where
the state is responsible. The more complicated question is whether
this right extends to an affirmative duty of states to take steps to
prevent a reduction in, or promote, life expectancy.40
Article 11(1) of the 1966 Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights provides that individuals have the right to an
adequate standard of living and to the continuous improvement of
living conditions.' Article 12 of the Covenant recognizes
individuals' right to health and provides that state parties will take
34. Merrills, supra note 2, at 36.
35. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 6.
36. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as
amended by Protocol No. 11, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 005, available at http:
//conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm [hereinafter European
Convention].
37. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, available
at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-32.htm [hereinafter American
Convention].
38. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 6, art. 6; American
Convention, supra note 37, art. 4.
39. See European Convention, supra note 36, art. 8 ("Everyone has the right to respect for
his private and family life, his home and his correspondence."); American Convention, supra
note 37, art. 11 § 2 ("No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his
private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor
or reputation."); id. art. 21 § 1 ("Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his
property.... ."); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 6, art. 17 § 1
("1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence .. ").
40. Robin Churchill, Environmental Rights in Existing Treaties, in HUMAN RIGHTS
APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 89, 90, supra note 1.
41. Supranote 8, art. 11(1).
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steps to improve environmental and industrial hygiene and to
prevent, treat, and control diseases.42 To the extent that such
diseases are connected to air and water pollution, the Covenant can
be read to establish environmental obligations. 3 In addition, as
discussed above, Article 24 of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of
the Child provides that children have the right to the highest
attainable standard of health."
B. The Right to Life
1. The Case of the Huaorani in Ecuador
The Ecuadorian government, in pursuing an aggressive strategy
of oil development from the late 1960's into the present day, has
reformed domestic laws to encourage foreign direct investment,
privatized state-owned oil companies, opened up new areas for oil
exploration and extraction, and expanded the Trans-Ecuadorian
Oil Pipeline.4 ' The intensified oil activity has impacted the
Huaorani people, among other indigenous peoples in the Oriente
region of Ecuador (the Amazon basin). Despite thirty years of
contact with Catholic and other missionaries, the Huaorani remain
hunters and gatherers whose lives and religion are interdependent
with the natural environment.
4 6
In 1990, a petition filed on behalf of the Huaorani by national
and international indigenous rights groups and international
environmental groups with the Inter-American Commission for
Human Rights alleged that oil development activities on
indigenous lands threatened the Huaorani's physical and cultural
survival.47  The petition referred to rights protected under the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Articles I
42. Id. art. 12.
43. The European Social Charter (revised), art. 11, May 3, 1996, E.T.S. 163, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/163.htm, and the Protocol of San
Salvador, supra note 21, art. 10, also provide for the right to health.
44. Supra note 19.
45. Adriana Fabra, Indigenous Peoples, Environmental Degradation, and Human Rights: A Case
Study, in HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 245, supra note 1, at
249-51.
46. Id. at 248-49.
47. See Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador, ch. VIII, Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96 Doc. 10 rev. 1 (April 24,
1997), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/ecuador-eng/index - ecuador.htm.
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(the right to life, liberty and personal security) and XI (the right to
the preservation of the health and well being of the individual) .4
Furthermore, the petition referenced the American Convention
Articles 4 (right to life) and 5(1) (the right to physical, mental and
moral integrity) .
In particular, the petitioners alleged that waste products
generated by exploratory drilling were disposed of in open pits and
that other wastes were placed in unlined and/or uncapped buried
pits. Moreover, the petitioners claimed that crude oil was also
released into the environment through spills from the Trans-
Ecuadorian Pipeline. Ultimately, the petitioners alleged that rivers,
streams and groundwater used for drinking, cooking and bathing
were contaminated with crude oil and other waste; that the local air
was contaminated when waste oil and gas were burned off without
any emission controls; and that the soil they used to cultivate food
was ruined by waste. Roads built to transport necessary goods were
sprayed with waste crude, leaving the Huaorani and others
constantly exposed to the oil and oil-coated dust particles in the air.
In addition, the oil development allegedly resulted in noise that
drove game away, and an increase in riverboat traffic and oil spills
that further impacted fishing, bathing and drinking water supplies.
It was alleged that people exposed to pollution from the
development have suffered skin rashes, stomach problems, chronic
headaches and fever.
The aforementioned environmental transgressions, so common
in the developing world (and to a lesser extent in industrialized
nations), and the kinds of harm they commonly induce have not
traditionally been linked with human rights violations. There are
many potential explanations for this, and I will not speculate on
their relative merits. What is critical here is that the case of the
Huaorani broke new ground in its explicit acknowledgement that
environmental harm suffered by an indigenous community
constituted a violation of human rights. Indeed, the Commission
concluded:
The right to have one's life respected is not... limited to protection
against arbitrary killing. States Parties are required to take certain
48. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Organization of American States,
International American Conference, 9th Sess. (1948).
49. American Convention, supra note 37.
50. Id.
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positive measures to safeguard life and physical integrity. Severe
environmental pollution may pose a threat to human life and health,
and in the appropriate case give rise to an obligation on the part of a
state to take reasonable measures to prevent such risk or the
necessary measures to respond when persons have suffered injury. '
The Commission stated that the government is obligated to
investigate and provide redress for any and all environmental
harms.
2. The Case of the Yanomami in Brazil
The case of the Yanomami involved a plan by the Brazilian
government to redistribute indigenous lands in the Amazon to
cattle ranchers, loggers and others. The process posed obvious
challenges to the Indians' right to property, as traditionally
understood. "The Indians' ownership and effective possession is
constantly being threatened, usurped, or eroded by various acts-
in particular, by invasion and unlawful intrusion for the purpose of
lumbering, mining, or agricultural operations, or for
nonindigenous settlements."02 Moreover, the process of boundary
demarcation and territorial reallocation spurred violent encounters
between new settlers and indigenous peoples to the extent that
various tribes were threatened with extinction.
The construction of roads and dams, along with the intrusion of
settlers and their agricultural or timber practices, wreaked havoc
on the Yanomami's environment. Fishing and hunting became
more and more difficult as water supplies were polluted and forests
were cut down. Moreover, a variety of foreign diseases were
introduced. The Yanomami filed a petition with the Inter-
American Commission for Human Rights, alleging that the survival
of their culture and way of life was threatened.
The Commission found that the Yanomami's "integrity as a
people and as individuals is under constant attack by both invading
prospectors and the environmental pollution they create. State
protection against these constant pressures and invasions is
irregular and feeble, so that they are constantly in danger and their
51. Id.
52. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Brazil, ch. VI, 33, Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.97 Doc. 29 rev.1 (Sept. 29,
1997), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/brazil-eng/index%20-
%20brazil.htm.
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environment is suffering constant deterioration."5 3  The Commission
recommended that Brazil institute federal protection measures
"with regard to Indian lands threatened by invaders."5 4
3. Other Cases
There are several other cases that bear directly on the right to life
claim for environmental protection. In one case, a group of
Canadian citizens alleged that the storage of radioactive waste near
their homes threatened their right to life.5 The United Nations
Human Rights Committee concluded that the case was
inadmissible due to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. 6
C. The Right to Property
1. The European Cases
Pollution or other environmental degradation which has
deleterious effects of a certain degree on a person's home or
private and family life may constitute a breach of Article 8 of the
European Convention.7 Such pollution may be justified under
Article 8(2), however, if the activity benefits the economic well-
being of the country. There are two relevant cases in the
jurisprudence of the European Commission and European Court
on Human Rights that reflect on litigation dealing with the right to
property and environmental harm.
In Lopez-Ostra v. Spain, Mrs. Lopez-Ostra had suffered from fumes
of a tannery waste treatment plant operating within yards of her
home and the Spanish courts refused her request to suspend the
plant's operation." The Court found that the government had
failed to strike a fair balance between the interest of the
municipality's economic well-being and her right to respect for her
home and private and family life.59 In G. and E. v. Norway, two
53. Id. 1 82(1)(f) (emphasis added).
54. Id. 82(2)(e).
55. E.H.P. v. Canada, Communication No. 67/1980 (Oct. 27, 1982), in UNITED NATIONS,
2 SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL
20, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2, U.N. Sales No. E.89.XIV.1 (1990).
56. Id. at 22.
57. European Convention, supra note 36.
58. Lopez-Ostra v. Spain, 303 Eur. Ct. H.R. 38 1-15 (1994).
59. Id. 158.
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members of the indigenous Lapp people complained that a
proposed hydroelectric project would flood part of their traditional
reindeer grazing grounds. °  The European Commission
determined that the amount of land was too small to constitute
interference, and that even if it did, it was justified under Article
8(2) because it was necessary for the economic well-being of the
country."
From the foregoing cases, it might be concluded that, in a
manner analogous to a tort claim, an individual will be entitled to
compensation for environmental harm only if the burden placed
upon her is unreasonable. In Lopez-Ostra the European Court
seems to have served as a court-of-last-resort in which this claim
could be heard. Of course, the European Union is in a unique
situation, where a continental federalism is replacing the structures
of independent nation-states. It is far less likely that the Inter-
American Court, or any UN body, will be able to serve a similar role
for private parties seeking civil justice, as nations will be far more
reluctant to submit to such institutions.
2. The Case of the Awas Tingni
In another critical case, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights argued on behalf of the Awas Tingni against the
Nicaraguan government. In particular, the Commission
requested that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights declare
that Nicaragua abstain from granting or considering granting any
concessions to exploit natural resources on Awas Tingni lands until
appropriate boundaries had been drawn.6"
The Commission argued that the life of the Awas Tingni depends
on agriculture, hunting and fishing, and that the relationship
between the people and the land is protected under the American
Convention. 64  In the most pertinent part for the present
discussion, the Commission argued that Nicaragua violated Article
21, the right to property, by granting logging concessions on lands
60. G. and E. v. Norway, App. No. 9278/81 & 9415/81, 35 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
30, 31-34 (1984).
61. Id. at 36.
62. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua (Aug. 31, 2001), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecing/serie-c-79_ing.doc.
63. Id. 3.
64. Id. 1 104, 140.
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traditionally used by the Awas Tingni.5 The Commission argued
that the concession itself endangered the economic interests,
survival and cultural integrity of the tribe, and the destruction it
brought violated their right to property."
The Court ruled that Article 21 included the Awas Tingni's
communal form of ownership, and that the government had to
carry out the demarcation and tiling of property, and abstain from
either engaging in or granting concessions to engage in operations
such as mining and logging that may affect the value, use or
61
enjoyment of the property in dispute. Most importantly, the
Court ruled that Nicaragua violated the members of the Awas
Tingni's right to the use and enjoyment of their property.8
It is important to note that the Court did not explicitly state that
environmental harm comprised a violation of the right. Rather, it
was the titling of the land to others and the refusal to acknowledge
their ownership of the land that constituted the violation. This
represents a critical limitation for the present analysis. It may be
that in certain circumstances environmental protection can be
accomplished through human rights tribunals without having the
right to a clean environment, in any guise, explicitly recognized.
D. Summary
The bi-polar approach to environmental advocacy through
human rights regimes has generated far less scholarly interest than
has the polycentric movement to create a right to a clean or healthy
environment. Perhaps this is because the scope of an individual
case is far smaller than the scope of a potential new human rights
treaty. Perhaps this is because the body of case law is diminutive,
and its immediate impact severely limited, its ultimate
repercussions unknown. Or perhaps it is because the bi-polar
approach represents a practitioner's file rather than a policy-
maker's dilemma. Whatever the reasons, there is no theoretical
canon from which to draw, and I am left largely on my own to
analyze the case law.
The only truly successful claim for environmental harm as a
human rights violation-made in the case of the Huaorani-
65. Id. 140(k).
66. Id.
67. Id. 1 153.
68. Id.
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shares with a majority of the other cases an emphasis on the rights
of indigenous peoples. Indeed, it seems quite likely that the
cultural rights of indigenous peoples and the right to their lives
and lifestyles represent motifs likely to figure prominently in the
development of this jurisprudence. Ultimately, it seems that claims
for indigenous peoples' right to life and right to property will
succeed where other claims would likely fail. For any variety of
psycho-historical reasons, governments acknowledge the
interdependence of indigenous peoples and their environments.
The relationships between non-indigenous peoples and their
environments, however, are mediated by government decisions that
are agreed to be the proper domain for such decision-making to
occur. Thus, it is easier to view indigenous peoples as victims of
government abuse when it comes to environmental degradation.
Non-indigenous citizens, it is thought, have their say elsewhere.
Moreover, the right to property, though providing a vehicle for
environmental protection, appears less likely to garner the same
support as the right to life. That is, environmental degradation
may well comprise a violation to the right to life in the limited
circumstances of indigenous peoples, but is far less likely to
comprise a violation of the right to property even in those
circumstances. Bearing in mind the limits on the ruling in Lopez-
Ostra as belonging to the unique province of the EU, as well as the
general exceptions to protections in the name of economic
development and well-being, nations are likely to prove reluctant,
at best, to make any attempt to regulate decisions that relate in a
fundamental manner to domestic industry and government.
VI. CONCLUSION
The creation of a new right to a clean environment involves a set
of assumptions about the legal weight of environmental rights that
must be distinguished from assumptions about their moral weight.
The attempt to create a new treaty or convention for
environmental rights may-and I believe will- prove to have less
of an impact, at least in the near future, than filing petitions in and
otherwise working through existing bodies already authorized to
address human rights complaints. This latter approach, though
limited in its scope and reach, deals more directly with the actual
legal status of environmental rights and, while still relying on their
[Vol. 28:2
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moral impetus as inspiration, pushes for their increasing
acceptance in the international arena.
